I. The Decline of Job Loss
The Federal-State Unemployment Insurance Program provides cash benefits to experienced workers who become unemployed "through no fault of their own" and who meet other 
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Source: Author's calculations using data on weekly new claims for unemployment insurance benefits (www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/eta/ui/current.htm, accessed 2 January 2008), expressed as a percent of nonfarm employment in the Current Employment Survey (http://data.bls.gov/cgibin/surveymost?ce, accessed 2 January 2008).
Shigeru Fujita and Garey Ramey (2006) estimate employment-to-unemployment flows using data on labor force status in short CPS panels rather than data on unemployment by duration in CPS cross sections. They also find dramatic declines in employment-to-unemployment flow rates since the early 1980s. Jay Stewart (2002) Measures of (gross) job destruction by employers also point to declining risks of job loss for American workers. The job destruction rate is calculated by summing employment declines over all employer units that shrink or exit during a given time interval and then dividing by the overall level of employment to obtain a rate. This measure captures the rate at which employers eliminate employment positions rather than the rate at which workers lose jobs but, not surprisingly, the two are closely linked: Layoffs are highly concentrated at declining establishments, job destruction and layoff rates move together over time, and layoffs rise steeply (BLS data), lower than any other period back to 1990 . Job destruction measures constructed from the Longitudinal Business Database at the Bureau of the Census also show a decline in private sector destruction rates after the early to mid 1980s .
Quarterly data for the manufacturing sector pieced together from multiple sources suggest that job destruction rates have trended downward since the early 1960s (Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger, 2006) . 
II. Why the Decline of Job Loss Matters

A. Lower (Frictional) Unemployment
In search equilibrium models along the lines of Dale T. Mortensen and Christopher A.
Pissarides (1994), less job destruction means fewer job-losing workers, smaller unemployment inflows and lower unemployment rates. Given the empirical evidence summarized in Section I, it is natural to ask whether this simple MP mechanism explains the large drop in U.S.
unemployment inflows and unemployment rates since the early 1980s. to 2005 and 20 percent of its average value. In other words, the results in Davis et al. (2007) imply that the simple MP mechanism accounts for nearly half of the decline in unemployment inflow rates from 1990 to 2005. The MP mechanism also accounts for much of the decline in unemployment inflow rates over the longer period since the early 1980s.
Other important factors behind the long term decline in unemployment inflow rates include the aging of the work force and the increase in average worker experience after 1980. These factors matter because more experienced workers have stronger labor force attachment and lower quit propensities. Hence, they are less likely to flow into the unemployment pool after a workerinitiated separation or a temporary exit from the labor force. See Shimer (1998) In an accounting sense, lower unemployment rates since the 1970s and early 1980s are largely explained by the secular decline in unemployment inflow rates. This conclusion is apparent from a visual inspection of time series charts for unemployment inflow (job loss) and outflow (job finding) rates in Fujita and Ramey (2006) , Davis et al. (2007) , Elsby et al. (2006) and Shimer (2007) . The job-finding rate exhibits pronounced cyclical fluctuations but little change over the longer term in recent decades. In contrast, unemployment inflow and job loss measures show large, persistent declines since the 1970s and early 1980s. Combining this observation with the result that lower job destruction rates explain nearly half the long term drop in the unemployment inflow rate, it follows that the simple MP mechanism sketched above explains much of the longer term drop in the unemployment rate since the 1970s and 1980s. See Davis et al. (2007) for a fuller development of this point.
B. Reduced Costs of Worker Displacement
More than 10 percent of U.S. workers separate from their employers in an average quarter, many because of layoffs or discharges for cause. See Bruce Fallick and Charles A. A recent study by Sullivan and Till von Wachter (2007) investigates the effect of job loss on mortality for the same sample of workers. Their chief result is that job loss by high-seniority workers in mass-layoff events leads to a 15-20 percent increase in death rates over the following 20 years. As Sullivan and von Wachter remark, if this mortality effect continues beyond the 20-year period, it implies a life expectancy reduction of about 1.5 years for a high-seniority worker displaced at age 40 in a mass-layoff event.
It is worth stressing that these two studies do not, by design, consider representative job losers. Instead, they focus on high-seniority employees who lose jobs with larger employers in mass-layoff events. Each of these sample selection criteria is associated with bigger postdisplacement earnings losses for job-losing workers and, probably, with more severe consequences in other respects. In addition, the 1980-1986 period covers the deepest U.S.
recession and the highest unemployment rates since World War II. Thus, the workers who lost jobs in this period faced an unusually difficult labor market. For these reasons, I interpret these studies as providing powerful evidence that job loss involves persistent and significant economic hardship in certain circumstances, but not necessarily in other circumstances. Many studies provide evidence that job loss can involve other significant costs in the form of reduced employment stability, lower consumption, a loss of health insurance coverage, higher rates of depression, and a loss of self esteem. See Sullivan and von Wachter (2007) for references.
In light of the results from worker displacement studies, there is an important good-news corollary to the evidence summarized in Section I. In particular, the dramatic declines in job loss rates since the 1970s and early 1980s suggest that American workers are also much less likely to suffer from costly worker displacement events. It is possible that job loss events are, on average, more costly today than in earlier decades, but I am unaware of persuasive evidence to this effect.
In any event, it would take a very large rise in the average cost of job loss to offset the big long term decline in the incidence of job loss.
C. A Rising Tide of Economic Insecurity?
The evidence summarized in Section I cuts against claims that American workers and families faced a rising tide of economic insecurity in recent years. There are many dimensions of economic insecurity, but the risk of job loss is usually seen as one of the major economic risks facing individuals. That particular risk has declined substantially. At a minimum, the long term decline in job loss rates calls for some revision to alarmist views about rising economic insecurity for American workers and families. At least one major element of economic security has improved in recent decades.
